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WEST VALLEY CITY, 
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vs. 
DENNIS STREETER, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 920349-CA 
Priority No, 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
On Appeal from the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
the Honorable WILLIAM A. THORNE, Presiding 
JERRALD D. CONDER 
MICHELLE J. IVIE 
CONDER & WANGSGARD 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
PAUL T. MORRIS (#3738) 
City Attorney 
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Assistant City Attorney 
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v 
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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the parties to the action in the Third Circuit Court, 
West Valley Department, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
captioned, West Valley City, Plaintiff
 r v. Dennis Streeter, 
Defendant, Civil No. 901001586MC (which, for the purposes of 
appeal, has been consolidated with the action captioned, West 
Valley City, Plaintiff, v. Dennis L. Streeter, Defendant, Civil No. 
901001677MC), were as follows: 
West Valley City1 Plaintiff/Appellee 
Dennis Streeter Defendant/Appellant 
The case was captioned West Valley City v. Dennis Streeter in the Third Circuit Court. Appellant Streeter has incorrectly 
captioned this appeal as State of Utah v. Dennis L Streeter. The State of Utah is not a party to this action, nor is West Valley City 
prosecuting a state statute on behalf of the State of Utah. The ordinance at issue in this case is a West Valley City ordinance, and 
the proper Plaintiff is West Valley City. 
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JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
West Valley City accepts Appellant Streeter's presentation of 
the issues presented on appeal and the appropriate standard of 
review. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
7 U.S.C. § 2156 See Addendum B 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-103: 
10-1-103. Construction. 
The powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be 
liberally construed to permit the municipality to exercise the 
powers granted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to 
the intent of the law. 1977 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-106: 
10-1-106. Scope of act. 
This act shall apply to all municipalities incorporated 
or existing under the law of the State of Utah except as 
otherwise specifically excepted by the home rule provisions of 
Article XI, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. 1977 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1210: 
10-3-1210. Function of the council. 
The municipal council of a municipality adopting an 
optional form of government provided for in this part shall 
pass ordinances, appropriate funds, review municipal 
administration, and perform all duties that may be required of 
it by law. 1977 
Utah Code Ann. S 10-8-47: 
10-8-47. Intoxication — Fights — Disorderly conduct — 
Assault and battery — Petit larceny — Riots and 
disorderly assemblies — Firearms and fireworks — 
1 
False pretenses and embezzlement — Sale of liquor, 
narcotics or tobacco to minors — Possession of 
controlled substances — Treatment of alcoholics 
and narcotics or drug addicts. 
They may prevent intoxication, fighting, quarrelling, dog 
fights, cockfights, prize fights, bullfights, and all 
disorderly conduct and provide agciinst and punish the offenses 
of assault and battery and petit larceny; they may restrain 
riots, routs, noises, disturbances or disorderly assemblies in 
any street, house or place in the city; they may regulate and 
prevent the discharge of firearms, rockets, powder, fireworks 
or any other dangerous or combustible material; they may 
provide against and prevent the offense of obtaining money or 
property under false pretenses and the offense of embezzling 
money or property in all cases where the money or property 
embezzled or obtained under false pretenses does not exceed in 
value the sum of $100 and may prohibit the sale, giving away 
or furnishing of intoxicating liquors or narcotics, or of 
tobacco to any person under twenty-one years of age; cities 
may, by ordinance, prohibit the possession of controlled 
substances as defined in the Utah Controlled Substances Act, 
provided the conduct is not a class A misdemeanor or felony, 
and provide for treatment of alcoholics, narcotic addicts and 
other persons who are addicted to the use of drugs or 
intoxicants such that they substantially lack the capacity to 
control their use of the drugs or intoxicants, and judicial 
supervision may be imposed as a means of effecting their 
rehabilitation. 1981 
Utah Code Ann, & 10-8-59: 
10-8-59• Cruelty to animals. 
They may prohibit cruelty to animals. 1953 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84: 
10-8-84. Ordinances, rules and regulations — Passage — 
Penalties. 
They may pass all ordinances and rules, an [and] make all 
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into 
effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred by this 
chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide for the 
safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, 
improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, and 
convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the 
protection of property in the city; and may enforce obedience 
to the ordinances with fines or penalties as they may deem 
proper, but the punishment of any offense shall be by fine not 
to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 
76-3-301 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by 
both the fine and imprisonment. 1986 
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Section 23-5-104(8), West Valley City Municipal Code: 
23-5-104. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS PROHIBITED. 
(8) Animals for fighting: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person or 
corporation to raise, keep or use any animal, 
fowl or bird for the purpose of fighting or 
baiting; and for any person to be a party to 
or be present as a spectator at any such 
fighting or baiting of any animal or fowl; and 
for any person, firm or corporation to 
knowingly rent any building, shed, room, yard, 
ground or premises for any such purposes as 
aforesaid, or to knowingly suffer or permit 
the use of his buildings, sheds, rooms, yards, 
grounds or premises for the purposes 
aforesaid, 
(b) Law Enforcement Officers or Office of Animal 
Control officials may enter any building or 
place where there is an exhibition of the 
fighting or baiting of a live animal, or where 
preparations are being made for such an 
exhibition, and the Law Enforcement Officers 
may arrest persons there present and take 
possession of all animals engaged in fighting, 
or there found for the purposes of fighting, 
along with all implements or applications used 
in such exhibition. This provision shall not 
be interpreted to authorize a search or arrest 
without a warrant when such is required by 
law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
West Valley City accepts Appellant Streeter's presentation of 
the statement of the case. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
West Valley City accepts Appellant Streeter's presentation of 
the facts, with the following additions: 
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1. Streeter was charged by citation and information (R-l. 1; 
R-2. 1-2 ) 2 with violating § 23-5-104 of the West Valley City 
Municipal Code3. Section 23-5-104(8) provides that, "It shall be 
unlawful for any person or corporation to raise, keep or use any 
animal, fowl or bird for the purpose of fighting or baiting . . . " 
2. In Case No. 901001586MC, Streeter specifically admitted 
conduct establishing the elements of the crime, and entered a 
conditional plea of guilty subject to retaining his right to 
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. (R-l. 17-24) 
3. In Case No. 901001677MC, Streeter specifically admitted 
conduct establishing the elements of the crime, and entered a 
conditional plea of guilty subject to retaining his right to 
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. (R-l, 26-34) 
2Case No. 901001586MC and Case No. 901001677MC were consolidated by the Court of Appeals under Case No. 92-
0349CA. Because the trial court's record is numbered individually under each case number, all references to the Record shall be 
as follows: R-1 shall pertain to the Record in Case No. 901001586MC, and all references to R-2 shall pertain to Case No. 
901001677MC 
Throughout Appellant's Brief, Streeter incorrectly refers to the West Valley City Municipal Code as "Revised West Valley 
City OrdinancesVRWVCO." Section 1-1-101 of the West Valley City Municipal Code reads as follows: 
1-1-101. HOW CODE DESIGNATED AND CITED. 
The ordinances embraced in the following chapters and sections shall constitute 
and be designated "The West Valley City Municipal Code," and may be so cited. Such 
Code may also be cited as the "West Valley City Code" or "Code." 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF WEST VALLEY CITY TO 
ENACT § 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE, WHICH PROHIBITS ANY PERSON 
FROM RAISING, KEEPING OR USING ANY FOWL OR 
BIRD FOR THE PURPOSE OF FIGHTING. 
West Valley City is an incorporated city, established pursuant 
to the provisions of Title 10 of the Utah Code. It derives its 
police power with regard to the prevention of cockfighting and its 
supporting activities from both specific grants of power and the 
general welfare provisions of Title 10. Utah case law clearly 
establishes that the City's police power should be liberally 
construed and that municipalities have wide discretion in the 
exercise of their police power in the public interest. Courts will 
not interfere with the City legislative body's use of police power 
as long as its use is reasonably related to providing for the 
public safety, health, morals and welfare. In this case, the 
prohibition against raising, keeping or using birds or fowl for the 
purpose of fighting is a reasonable use of the City's police power 
to further the legislative policy against animal fighting ventures. 
Furthermore, the West Valley City ordinance is not an 
extraterritorial criminal statute, but, rather, only regulates 
activity within West Valley City. 
Appellant Streeter's argument is based on the false premise 
that West Valley City is a chartered city, and the cases upon which 
he relies are outdated and have been overruled. 
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POINT II 
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code 
contains no uncertain or confusing terms, and is not vague on its 
face. Also, the ordinance is not vague in its application to 
Streeter. He has admitted committing the specific elements of the 
crime, Streeter lacks standing to raise questions of vagueness 
regarding hypothetical fact situations. 
POINT III 
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVER-
BROAD. 
Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code is 
not over-broad, and does not impinge upon innocent conduct. The 
ordinance contains a clear mental element which requires that game 
birds be raised, kept or used "for the purpose of fighting." This 
mental element protects those who may innocently own game birds, 
but who have no intent that the birds fight. Also, Streeter has no 
standing to raise hypothetical challenges to the ordinance, and the 
ordinance is clearly not over-broad as it relates to the facts of 
his case. 
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POINT IV 
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT PREEMPTED BY THE ANIMAL 
WELFARE ACT AMENDMENT OF 1976, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2156, NOR DOES IT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
RESTRICT THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. 
The Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976, 7 U.S.C. § 2156, has 
a specific section expressing Congress' intent to not preempt state 
law except in cases of direct and irreconcilable conflict with the 
federal statute. 7 U.S.C. § 2156(h). There is no direct and 
irreconcilable conflict between the federal statute and the West 
Valley City ordinance. To the contrary, the West Valley City 
ordinance is compatible with the federal statute. The federal 
statute and the ordinance compliment each other and further the 
common legislative policy of restricting or prohibiting animal 
fighting. 
Also, the ordinance does not restrict interstate travel. It 
is a reasonable exercise of police power and is not in conflict 
with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United State Constitution. 
POINT V 
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE IS A REASONABLE USE OF THE 
CITY'S POLICE POWER FOR THE PUBLIC WELFARE, 
AND DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, § 1 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code is 
a reasonable exercise of the City's police power, and furthers the 
legislative purpose of preventing cockfighting. In reasonable 
exercises of the City's police power, the City may prohibit or 
restrict an individual's right to possess or use property. 
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Constitutional provisions, such as Article I, § 1 of the Utah 
Constitution, which relate to the rights of individuals to acquire 
or possess property, must be construed and applied in light of the 
police power of the City as expressed by its legislative body. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF WEST VALLEY CITY TO 
ENACT § 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE, WHICH PROHIBITS ANY PERSON 
FROM RAISING, KEEPING OR USING ANY FOWL OR 
BIRD FOR THE PURPOSE OF FIGHTING. 
It is clearly within the authority of the West Valley City 
Council, as legislative body for West Valley City, to enact an 
ordinance which makes it unlawful for any person to raise, keep or 
use any bird or fowl for the purpose of fighting. Streeter's 
argument that the City has exceeded its authority is premised on 
the incorrect notion that West Valley City is a chartered city 
subject to the language of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. This premise is plainly incorrect, since West Valley 
City is not a chartered city. (See Addendum A, Articles of 
Incorporation of West Valley City.) 
West Valley City is an incorporated city created pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-101, et seq. It derives 
its authority from the provisions of Title 10 of the Utah Code, 
which apply to all municipalities except those subject to the home 
rule (charter cities) provisions of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-106. The City has adopted the 
council-manager form of government allowed under the "Optional 
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Forms of Municipal Government Act," Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1201, et 
seq. This alternative form of government retains all the rights, 
powers and duties granted to other municipalities of the same 
class. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1205. In West Valley City's form of 
government, it is the City Council which performs the legislative 
function and has the responsibility for passing City ordinances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1210. The City Council's authority to enact 
§ 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code, making it 
unlawful to raise, keep or use birds or fowl for the purpose of 
fighting, is based both upon specific grants of power and a general 
grant of power contained in Title 10 of the Utah Code. 
First, in Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-47, the Legislature 
specifically grants cities the authority to prevent cockfights. 
This section provides no restrictions or limits on the manner in 
which cockfights are to be prevented. Clearly, the manner in which 
cockfights are prevented is left to the discretion of the city. 
The second specific grant of authority is contained in Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-59, which grants cities the authority to prohibit 
cruelty to animals. Again, it is clearly left to the discretion of 
the cities how they wish to implement such a prohibition. 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 provides that a city: 
. . may pass all ordinances and rules, an 
[and] make all regulations, not repugnant to 
law, necessary for carrying into effect or 
discharging all powers and duties conferred by 
this chapter, and as are necessary and proper 
to provide for the safety and preserve the 
health, and promote the prosperity, improve 
the morals, peace and good order, comfort, and 
convenience of the city and its inhabitants, 
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and for the protection of property in the 
city . . . 
This general grant of authority, often referred to as a "general 
welfare" clause, grants West Valley City the authority to enact 
such ordinances as it feels are necessary for the good of its 
citizens. This general welfare clause provides the City with a 
basis for the use of its police power in the best interests of its 
citizens. 
Ordinances which are enacted pursuant to a city's police power 
are presumed to be valid. Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County 
Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Utah 1981). General welfare 
clauses, in particular, should be liberally construed so that a 
municipality has wide discretion in the exercise of its police 
power. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980). 
Streeter misleads the court on the current state of Utah law 
when he states, "The police powers of West Valley City are strictly 
limited to those expressly granted by state constitution or 
statute." (Appellant's Brief, p. 13.) As authority for that 
proposition, he cites Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 150 P. 2d 773 
(Utah 1944) and Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P. 234 (Utah 1923). 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 13.) These two cases relied on what was 
known as the "Dillon Rule." The Dillon Rule, which was a very 
restrictive view of the powers of cities, was repudiated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the 1980 Hutchinson decision cited above. 
The Hutchinson court stated that, "The Dillon Rule of strict 
construction is antithetical to effective and efficient local and 
state government." Hutchinson, 624 P.2d, at 1126. The court also 
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wrote, "For the reasons stated herein, we expressly abandon the 
rule of strict construction of municipal and county powers insofar 
as it has heretofore had a basis in Utah law. Hutchinson, 624 
P.2d, at 1119 (footnote 3). The cases that Streeter relies upon in 
his argument are virtually all pre-Hutchinson "Dillon Rule" cases. 
In fact, many cases that Streeter cites, i.e., Nance} Sutter; 
Parker v. Provo City Corp., 543 P. 2d 796 (Utah 1975); Stevenson v. 
Salt Lake City, 317 P. 2d 597 (Utah 1957); and American Fork City v. 
Robinson, 292 P. 249 (Utah 1930), are all cited in Hutchinson as 
examples of the use of the now defunct "Dillon Rule." 
The Hutchinson decision provides the current Utah law with 
respect to the police power of local governments. In determining 
that general welfare grants of authority should be liberally 
construed, the court stated: 
When the state has granted general welfare 
power to local governments, those governments 
have independent authority apart from, and in 
addition to, specific grants of authority to 
pass ordinances which are reasonably and 
appropriately related to the objectives of 
that power, i.e., providing for the public 
safety, health, morals and welfare, [citation 
omitted] And the courts will not interfere 
with the legislative choice of the means 
selected unless it is arbitrary, or is 
directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent 
with the policy of, the state or federal laws 
or the constitution of this state or of the 
United States. 
Hutchinson, 624 P.2d, at 1126. With regard to specific grants of 
authority, the court stated that, "Specific grants should generally 
be construed with reasonable latitude in light of the broad 
language of the general welfare clause which may supplement the 
11 
power found in a specific delegation." Hutchinson, 624 P.2d, at 
1126. 
As stated in the above quotation from the Hutchinson case, 
courts will not interfere with the legislative body's use of police 
power unless it is arbitrary or prohibited by or inconsistent with 
law or the State or Federal Constitution. Whether or not it is 
inconsistent with federal law or the Utah Constitution is discussed 
elsewhere in this Brief. Streeter has advanced no argument or 
authority which indicates that it is prohibited by or inconsistent 
with State statutes. Therefore, the question is whether or not the 
statute enacted by the West Valley City Council, § 23-5-104(8), is 
arbitrary. 
The section at issue is clearly not arbitrary, and, as 
Hutchinson requires, it is reasonably related to providing for the 
public safety, health, morals and welfare. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d, 
at 1126. The ordinance specifically relates to and furthers the 
goal of the City to prevent cockfights. Since the City has a 
specific grant of power to prevent cockfights (Utah Code Ann. §10-
8-47), it naturally follows that it is within the City's power to 
prohibit activities which support cockfighting or facilitate 
cockfighting. This is a logical and reasonable way for the City to 
further its legislative purpose of preventing cockfighting. It is 
certainly not an unusual use of police power. For example, while 
in pursuit of the legislative purpose of prohibiting the use of 
illegal drugs, it is also clearly within the government's power to 
prohibit activities which support or facilitate drug use. 
12 
Therefore, statutes have been enacted which prohibit the possession 
of drugs or the possession of drug paraphernalia, regardless of 
actual use. 
Suppression of closely related activities and the necessary 
instruments of cockfighting clearly bears a reasonable relationship 
to preventing the undesired conduct. The Supreme Court of Illinois 
addressed this question in the case of Illinois Gamefowl Breeders 
Association v. Block, 389 N.E.2d 529 (111. 1979). In that case, 
the court stated that: 
We believe the prohibitions contained in 
subsections (a) and (c), e.g., owning, 
breeding, training, selling or transporting, 
are reasonably related to the proper 
governmental purpose of eliminating the evils 
associated with animal fighting. Clearly, the 
legislature intended to strengthen the ban on 
animal fighting by making it illegal to 
knowingly engage in the supporting activities 
which make animal fighting possible, and the 
prohibitions contained in subsections (a) and 
(c) were intended to insure that those who 
wish to stage such exhibitions will not be 
able to procure the needed animals from local 
breeders. 
Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association, 389 N.E.2d, at 533. 
Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code is 
similarly related to the valid legislative purpose of prohibiting 
cockfighting and the evils associated therewith. 
Streeter's argument hinges entirely on the idea that West 
Valley City citizens can only be harmed by cockfighting if they 
witness it; therefore, the only reasonable regulations are those 
prohibiting the actual fighting. (Appellant's Brief, p. 15; also 
footnote 4.) This argument has no merit whatsoever. If taken to 
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its logical conclusion, the absurd result would be a local 
government's police power being restricted to controlling public 
events. The City could not criminalize cockfighting which took 
place privately and which was not "witnessed" by the public. 
Presumably, this would also apply to other non-publicly witnessed 
conduct, such as private, illegal drug use. 
Streeter makes the additional argument that the West Valley 
City ordinance is unconstitutional as being an extraterritorial 
criminal statute, since cockfighting is legal in a few states. It 
is obvious that West Valley City cannot legislate beyond its 
boundaries. However, Streeter's argument is based on the 
supposition that it is legal to possess property in West Valley 
City which may be illegal to use in West Valley City, so long as 
there is some place where it may be lawfully used. It is not 
surprising that Streeter cites no authority to support this 
proposition, since the adoption of this argument would render many 
laws and ordinances unconstitutional, not just § 23-5-104(8). For 
example, Utah law prohibits the possession of marijuana (Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8), but some states allow the possession of a small 
amount of marijuana. Just because the possession of a limited 
amount of marijuana may be legal elsewhere, Utah is not barred from 
prohibiting its possession within Utah boundaries. Another example 
are the provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, which 
prohibit the possession of beer by the general public in containers 
larger than two liters. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-206. This statute 
effectively eliminated the general public's use of beer in kegs 
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within Utah. Obviously, most states in the United States, 
including Utah's surrounding states, allow beer kegs. Under 
Streeter's rationale, Utah would be allowed to prohibit the 
drinking of beer from kegs, but not allowed to prohibit the 
possession of a keg if the keg is to be used in a state where kegs 
are legal. 
The unsound basis of this argument is apparent. In reality, 
Streeter is urging the extraterritorial application of Arizona law 
to West Valley City. The fact that cockfighting may be legal in 
Arizona has absolutely no effect outside the boundaries of Arizona, 
and does not impair West Valley City's ability to prescribe certain 
conduct within the boundaries of West Valley City. 
It is clear that the enactment of § 23-5-104(8) by West Valley 
City is a valid exercise of the police power granted to the City by 
Title 10 of the Utah Code. Streeter's argument is based on an 
incorrect premise and outdated case law, and should be disregarded. 
POINT II 
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that 
a statute or ordinance define an "offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people 
can understand what conduct is prohibited and 
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement." 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P. 2d 816 (Utah 1991), 
quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 
1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). In a vagueness challenge that does 
not involve constitutionally protected conduct, the court should 
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uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague 
in all of its applications. Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipslde, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 480, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 71 
L.Ed.2d 362, 369 (1982). The "constitutionally protected conduct" 
referred to is limited to First Amendment conduct, which is not at 
issue here. State v. Archambeau, 820 P. 2d 920, 928-footnote 16 
(Utah App. 1991). Also, legislative enactments are reviewed with 
the presumption that they are constitutional. Archambeau, 820 
P. 2d, at 927. Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City 
Municipal Code clearly delineates the conduct which it prohibits 
and is not vague or confusing on its face or in its application to 
Streeter. 
An ordinance may be challenged both on its face and in its 
application. In this case, a facial attack upon the ordinance is 
obviously not successful. The ordinance contains no uncertain or 
confusing terms. The clear legislative purpose is to prohibit 
people from raising, keeping or using animals for the specific 
purpose of fighting. It is doubtful that the purpose could be 
written any clearer than the language of this ordinance which 
states, "It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to 
raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or bird for the purpose of 
fighting or baiting . . . " Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley 
City Municipal Code. 
An ordinance may also be challenged for vagueness in its 
application. In this type of challenge, the ordinance must be 
examined in light of the facts of the case. United States v. 
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Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 42 L.Ed.2d 706, 713, 95 S. Ct. 710 
(1975). In this case, Streeter argues that the ordinance lacks a 
scienter or intent requirement, which renders its application 
vague. This is simply not an accurate representation of the 
elements of § 23-5-104(8). The ordinance has a clear mental 
element requiring that the birds be raised, kept or used for the 
specific purpose of fighting or baiting. As was described by Judge 
Thorne in his Decision on the Motion to Dismiss: 
In a criminal prosecution under this 
ordinance, the City must present sufficient 
proof to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
the mental intent element of " . . . for the 
purpose of fighting or baiting . . . ." 
Requiring proof of a mental intent is not an 
unusual or suspect requirement, but in fact 
provides the necessary protections for 
11
 innocent" ownership. 
(R-l. 45; emphasis in original.) 
Streeter also argues that "a person who unknowingly possesses 
fowl or birds which could be used for "fighting or baiting," or 
which may be sold in a state where such "fighting or baiting" is 
legal, would be punished . . ." (Appellant's Brief, p. 23.) 
Besides being incorrect in light of the City's responsibility to 
prove the mental intent element of this ordinance, Streeter has no 
standing to bring such a challenge. As was set forth in the 
Mazurie case cited above, Streeter's vagueness challenge must be 
examined in light of the facts of his case. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated, "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is 
clearly prescribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as 
applied to the conduct of others." Greenwood, 817 P.2d, at 820, 
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quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 
Inc., 445 U.S. 480, 494-95, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 
369 (1982). See also, Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S. Ct. 
2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439, 458 (1974), where the court stated, "One to 
whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully 
challenge it for vagueness." Streeter has made no allegation that 
he "unknowingly" possessed birds which could be used for fighting. 
To the contrary, he readily admits all of the elements of the 
crime. He admits that he raised and kept birds in West Valley City 
for the purpose of fighting them in the State of Arizona• Under 
the facts of this case, the statute is not void in its application 
to Streeter, and he has admitted each and every element of the 
crime. 
Section 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code is 
neither vague on its face nor in its application to the Defendant, 
Streeter. 
POINT III 
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVER-
BROAD. 
Section 23-5-104(8) is clearly not over-broad, since it does 
not prohibit constitutionally protected activity while prohibiting 
unprotected behavior. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987). 
The ordinance applies to those limited circumstances defined by its 
elements and does not sweep innocent conduct into a criminal act. 
Streeter attempts to argue overbreadth by providing the court 
with facts other than his own. For instance, he states: 
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The problem with this sweeping language is 
that it prohibits conduct, such as the simple 
possession of the game birds in West Valley 
City, which may be utilized for legal and 
legitimate activities in foreign 
jurisdictions. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 25.) He also makes the claim that the 
ordinance is subject to subjective enforcement by the Animal 
Control Director. (Appellant's Brief, p. 26.) Streeter clearly 
has no standing to bring these arguments to the court. These 
arguments present the court with hypothetical situations that are 
not concerned with the facts relating to Streeter. Streeter does 
not contend that he simply owned game birds. Streeter's facts are 
that he has admitted to raising and keeping birds for the purpose 
of fighting. The ordinance is clearly not over-broad as it relates 
to those facts. A person to whom a statute may be constitutionally 
applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may 
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations 
not before the court. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 
S. Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 839 (1973). 
Furthermore, Streeter's argument is not well-founded. The 
clear mental element of § 23-5-104(8), which requires the City to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the birds are kept or raised 
"for the purpose of fighting or baiting," obviously protects those 
who may innocently own game fowl without such intent. Similarly, 
the power of the Animal Control Director to impound birds is 
contingent upon proof of a violation of the ordinance, which would 
necessarily include the mental element, thereby protecting innocent 
parties. 
19 
Finally, Streeter again argues that § 23-5-104(8) is an 
extraterritorial criminal statute. This is simply not accurate, as 
was discussed under Point I on pages 13 and 14. 
Section 23-5-104(8) does not punish or prohibit the conduct of 
parties which falls outside of the specific prohibitions of the 
ordinance as set forth by its elements. Streeter has not shown 
that the element is over-broad on its face or in its application to 
him. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT PREEMPTED BY THE ANIMAL 
WELFARE ACT AMENDMENT OF 1976, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2156, NOR DOES IT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
RESTRICT THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. 
As Judge Thorne found in his well reasoned Decision, the 
Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976, 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (Addendum B), 
which prohibits activity relating to the moving of fighting animals 
in interstate commerce, does not preempt § 23-5-104(8) of the West 
Valley City Municipal Code, Judge Thorne noted that preemption is 
not to be lightly presumed [California Federal Savings and Loan 
Association v. Guerraf 479 U.S. 272, 107 S. Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 
613, 623 (1987)]; and, after a careful analysis of the federal 
statute, determined that it does not directly conflict with the 
West Valley City ordinance. (R-l. 38-42; Addendum C) 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that, "The question 
of whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is 
one of congressional intent . . . to discern Congress' intent we 
examined the explicit statutory language and the structure and 
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purpose of the statute," Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 
_ , 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474, 483 (1990). In this case, 
the federal statutory language clearly expresses Congress' intent 
on the extent to which the Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976 
preempts state law. Title 7, U.S.C., § 2156(h), states: 
The provisions of this chapter shall not 
supersede or otherwise invalidate any such 
state, local, or municipal legislation or 
ordinance relating to animal fighting ventures 
except in case of the direct and 
irreconcilable conflict between any 
requirements thereunder and this chapter or 
any rule, regulation or standard hereunder. 
By enacting this section, Congress reserved the individual 
municipality's right to regulate animal fighting, except in the 
case of a direct and irreconcilable conflict between the state and 
federal statutes. This is an indication of Congress' intent to 
interfere as little as possible with municipal regulation of animal 
fighting. In this case, Streeter has demonstrated no direct or 
irreconcilable conflict between the West Valley City ordinance and 
the federal statute. 
Streeter's entire argument is based upon the notion that since 
Congress chose not to criminalize interstate movement of fighting 
game birds which are being transported to a state which allows 
cockfighting, Congress has thereby established a preempting right 
to transport birds to such states. As Judge Thome correctly 
found: 
Congressional decisions not to criminalize 
certain conduct does not mean that all such 
conduct is federally protected. Failure of 
Congress to include a "shoplifting" statute 
within the scheme of federal offenses does not 
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mean that Congress has decided to protect such 
activity. 
(R-l. 41) There is no evidence whatsoever that Congress, by this 
omission in the federal criminal statute, intended to create a 
right to transport birds that Streeter can now rely on to preempt 
municipal ordinances. 
Furthermore, the West Valley City ordinance is compatible with 
the federal statute. The legislative policy reflected by both laws 
is an attempt to curtail the use of animals for fighting purposes. 
The federal law makes it a criminal act for any person to: 
. • . knowingly sell, buy;, transport or 
deliver to another person or receive from 
another person for purposes of transportation, 
in interstate or foreign commerce, any dog or 
other animal for purposes of having the dog or 
other animal participate in an animal fighting 
venture. 
7 U.S.C. § 2156(b) (emphasis added). The West Valley City 
ordinance prohibits the related but distinct conduct of a person 
who chooses to "raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or bird for the 
purpose of fighting or baiting." Section 23-5-104(8) of the West 
Valley City Municipal Code (emphasis added). These two laws 
complement each other and further the common legislative policy of 
restricting or prohibiting animal fighting. 
There is no direct or irreconcilable conflict between § 23-5-
104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code and 7 U.S.C. § 2156, 
the Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976. The acts are compatible, 
and the West Valley City ordinance is not preempted by the federal 
statute. 
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Streeter also argues that § 23-5-104(8) impermissibly 
infringes upon the right to travel, and therefore violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. As 
authority for this notion, Streeter cites Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). In Shapiro, 
however, the court rested its decision upon unjustified 
classifications of people with respect to a waiting period for 
welfare benefits. Even assuming that Shapiro applies to a police 
power case such as this (and the City contends that it does not), 
Streeter has not shown that the ordinance creates impermissible 
classifications or that he is a member of a protected class. 
If Streeter's argument were taken to its logical conclusion, 
virtually all criminal statutes would have to be identical among 
the fifty states. Differences among the states would "restrict" an 
individual's right to travel. This argument has no merit. As the 
Supreme Court stated in a decision of Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interests: 
. . . the Constitution does not recognize an 
absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty 
in each of its phases has its history and 
connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is 
liberty in a social organization which 
requires the protection of law against the 
evils which menace the health, safety, morals 
and welfare of the people. Liberty under the 
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to 
the restraints of due process, and regulation 
which is reasonable in relation to its subject 
and is adopted in the interests of the 
community is due process. 
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West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrlsh, 300 U.S. 379, 391, 57 S. Ct. 578, 
81 L.Ed. 703 (1936). § 23-5-104(8) is a reasonable exercise of 
police power that does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
POINT V 
SECTION 23-5-104(8) OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE IS A REASONABLE USE OF THE 
CITY'S POLICE POWER FOR THE PUBLIC WELFARE, 
AND DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, § 1 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The parties agree that where an important public interest 
requires the safeguarding of health, morals, safety or welfare, 
even the most basic property rights meiy be limited. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 36.) Section 23-5-104(8) is a reasonable use of police 
power in the public interest and does not violate Streeter's 
constitutional property rights. 
Constitutional provisions regarding the rights of acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property, in whatever terms expressed, 
must nevertheless be construed and applied in connection with the 
police power of the state. State v. Briggs, 146 P. 261, 262 (Utah 
1915) • 
As was discussed extensively under Point I, West Valley City 
has both specific authority (Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-47; § 10-8-59) 
and authority under the general welfare provision of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-8-84 to exercise its police power by preventing cockfighting 
and enacting ordinances for the general welfare of City citizens. 
In this case, Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-47 specifically granted the 
City the authority to prevent cockfights. As discussed under Point 
I, it is well within the City's police power to prohibit conduct 
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associated with, supporting or which may encourage or facilitate 
cockf ighting. The specific language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-47 is 
important. It does not say that the City may punish cockf ighting; 
but, rather, that the City may prevent it. That the City 
legislative body may determine it is in the public interest of the 
citizens of West Valley City to prevent cockfighting by prohibiting 
those activities which support or may contribute to cockfighting, 
is without question. Also, as was discussed extensively under 
Point I, the general welfare provision of Title 10 (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-8-84) clearly provides an additional basis for use of the 
City's police power in this case. 
Section 23-5-104(8) is a reasonable exercise of police power, 
which was enacted in the same spirit and upon the same rationale as 
the numerous other statutes and ordinances which prohibit 
possession of certain property. In fact, West Valley City's 
ordinance is less intrusive than many. Unlike ordinances which 
prohibit the possession of drug paraphernalia, drugs, alcohol or 
other banned property, the West Valley City ordinance does not 
restrict simple possession; but, rather, only restricts the keeping 
or raising of fowl "for the purpose of fighting or baiting." 
This limited intrusion upon individual property rights for the 
benefit and welfare of the public is a reasonable exercise of 
police power by a municipal legislative body, and is not in 
conflict with the Utah Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons advanced above, the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and denicil of Defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider Motion to Dismiss should be affirmed in all respects, 
and § 23-5-104(8) of the West Valley City Municipal Code should be 
found constitutionally sound, 
DATED this 9th day of October , 1992. 
J A feichard Catten 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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Addendum A 
Articles of Incorporation ol West Valley City 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevaid 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
CERTIFICATION 
I Karen S. Leftwich City Recorder 
West Valley City, do hereby certify the attached Articles of 
Incorporation __ 
dated May 14
 f 19 80 , to In a t i ue and correct copy 
ot said document as recorded and as on file in the West Valley city 
Recordf r ' i < I f i ro. 
DATED this 6th day of October , 1992 . 
3469608 
OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR/SECRETARY OF STATE 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, DAVID S. MONSON, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR/SECRETARY OF STATE OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT there has been filed in my office 
a certified copy of the Articles of Incorporation of WEST VALLEY CITY, dated 
May 14, 1980, complying with Section 10-2-108, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended 1977. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in compliance with the requirements of Section 
10-21-108, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 1977, notice is hereby given 
to all whom it may concern that the attached is a true and correct copy of 
the Articles of Incorporation referred to above on file with the Secretary 
of State pertaining to WEST VALLEY CITY, a city of the second class, located 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. The date of incorporation is indicated to be 
July 1, 1980. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto 
set my hand and affixed the Great 
Seal of the State of Utah at Salt 
Lake City, this 26th day of August, 
1980. 
DAVID S. MONSON 
Lt. Governor 
"^ 
— rc< 
, / c as6.~.£t 
Authorized Person 
CO 
CO 
en 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
(a M u n i c i p a l C o r p o r a t i o n ) 
The u n d e r s i g n e d , Henry P r i c e , b e i n g d u l y e l e c o e d and 
q u a l i f i e d Mayor o f West V a l l e y C i t y d o e s h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h e f o l -
l o w i n g : 
ARTICLE I 
NAME 
The name o f t h e C i t y i s WEST VALLEY CITY. 
ARTICLE I I 
DESCRIPTION 
The g e o g r a p h i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f WEST VALLEY CITY i s : 
Beginning a t the S. W. Comer Section 3, T. 2. S . , R. 2 W , , S. L. B. and M., 
and running thence North along the West l i n e o f s*id Section 3 and the West 
l i n e s of Section 34, 27 and 22, T. 1 S . , R. 2 W., S. L. B. and M., to the N. W. 
Corner of said Section 22; thence East along the North l i n e of Sections 22, 23 
and 24, T. I S . , R. 2 W., S. L. B. and M., to the Sa l t Lake City Boundary l i n e 
which i s located on the N. E. Corner of said Section 24; thence South 
50.0 feet along Lhe Boundary of Sa l t Lake City; theiice East along the Boundary 
l i n e o f Sa l t Lake City which l i n e i s 50 f ee t South of the North l i n e of Sect ions 
19, 20 and 21, T. I S . , R. 1 W., S. L. B. and M., to a point located 783.0 f ee t 
East of the West l i n e of said Section 21; thence South 69.35 f e e t , more or l e s s , 
along said boundary of Salt Lake City to a point 783.0 f ee t East and 119.35 fee t 
South from the N. W. Corner of said Section 21; thence continuing East along 
the boundary of Sal t Lake City to a point 117.83 feet South and 224.35 fee t 
West of the North h ODrner of Section 22, T. 1 S . , R. 1 W., S. L. B. and M.; 
thence S 2° 13* E 90.39 feet along the Sal t Lake City boundary; thence N 89° 41' I 
277.70 feet along the boundary of Sa l t Lake City; thence S 0° 04* 26w W along the 
East l i n e of Redwood road and the present boundary of Sa l t Lake City 142.69 feet 
to the North Right of Way l i n e of State Highway No. 201 (21st South Freeway); 
thence along said North l i n e and boundary of Salt Lake City as fo l lows, N 88° 41' 
82.00 feet to a point of a 2914.79 foot radius curve to the right; thence Easter 1 
along the arc of said curve 487.53 feet to a point of tangency; thence S 81° 44f 
431.2? feet to a point of a 5729.58 foot radius curve to the l e f t ; thence Easterl 
along the arc of said curve 481.67 feet to a point of tangency; thence S 86° 89* 
E 497.56 feetithence N 88° 46' 11" E 700 feet; thence N 87° 13* 41" E 1130 feet, • 
or l e w , t o the centerline of the 
Jordan River; thenoe leaving said North Right of Way Southerly along the center! 
of the Jordan River to the intersection of the Jordan River with the centerline 
of the Meadow Brook Expressway, which line i s 1650 feet, more or l e s s , North and 
1650 feet, more or less , East of the S. W. Cbrner of Section 35, T. 1 S., R. 1 W, 
S. L. B. and M.j thence in a South Westerly direction along the centerline of th< 
Meadow Brock Expressway to the midpoint of the South l ine of Section 34, T. 1 S.( 
R. 1 W., S. L. B. and M., which midpoint i s the South h Oomer of said Section 3* 
thrmce West along the South Line of Sections 34 and 33, T. I S . , R. 1 W., S. L. I 
and M., to the intersection of the midpoint of 2700 West Street, which intersects 
point i s the South h Corner of said Section 33; thenoe South along the midpoint c 
2700 South Street 5280 feet, more or l e s s , to the South h Corner of Section 4, 
T. 2 S. , R. 1 W., S. L. B. and M.; thence West along the South l ines of Sections 
4, 5 and 6, T. 2 S. , R. 1 W., S. L. B. and M., and the South l ines of Sections 1, 
2 and 3, T. 2 S. , R. 2 W., S. L. B. and M., to the Southwest Corner of said Sectl 
3 and ooint of beginning. 
ARTICLE I I I 
CLASSIFICATION 
According to populat ion , WEST VALLEY CITY i s - a c i t y of the s e -
cond c l a s s . 
ARTICLE IV 
DATE OF INCORPORATION 
WEST VALLEY CITY s h a l l become incorporated a s a municipal c o r -
porat ion a t 9:00 o ' c lock a.m. JuLyl , 1980. 
DATED t h i s / 4 ^ d a y of f|AY,, 1980. 
ATTEST 
GERRY ASHMAN 
HENRY PRICE, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he now and at all times mentioned in the foregoing Arti-
cles of Incorporation was the Mayor of WEST VALLEY CITY, that he 
has read the Articles, that the statements made therein are true 
to the best of his knowledge and belief and that the signature 
contained therein is the signature of said Mayor of WEST VALLEY 
CITY. 
ATTEST: 
CR
 GERRY ASHMAN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
0 n t h e
 /*/&& daY o f May, 1980, personally appeared before me 
HENRY PRICE, the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknow-
ledged to me that he executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, gliding in 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
2//Y//3 
Addendum B 
7 U.S.C. § 2156 -
Animal Fighting Venture Prohibition 
§ 2 1 5 6 . Animal fighting venture prohibition 
(a) Sponsoring or exhibiting animal in any fighting venture 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sponsor or 
exhibit an animal in any animal fighting venture to which any 
animal was moved in interstate or foreign commerce. 
(b) Buying, selling, delivering, or transporting animals for participation in 
animal fighting venture 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, buy, 
transport, or deliver to another person or receive from another 
person for purposes of transportation, in interstate or foreign com-
merce, any dog or other animal for purposes of having the dog or 
other animal participate in an animal fighting venture. 
(c) Use of Postal Service or other interstate instrumentality for promoting 
or furthering animal fighting venture 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly use the mail 
service of the United States Postal Service or any interstate instru-
mentality for purposes of promoting or in any other manner fur-
753 
7 § 2 1 5 6 TRANSPORTATION, ETC., OF ANIMALS Ch. 54 
thering an animal fighting venture except as performed outside the 
limits of the States of the United States. 
(d) Violation of State law 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of 
this section, the activities prohibited by such subsections shall be 
unlawful with respect to fighting ventures involving live birds only 
if the fight is to take place in a State where it would be in violation 
of the laws thereof. 
(e) Penalties 
Any person who violates subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section 
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more 
than 1 year, or both, for each such violation. 
rt^ |r,, _»:^~*;,^ ^t , . ; n j M ? r > n s ^y <^rrotorv. ^^Ktance bv other federal 
agencies; issuance of search warrant; forfeiture; costs recoveraoie 
in forfeiture or civil action 
The Secretary or any other person authorized by him shall make 
such investigations as the Secretary deems necessary to determine 
whether any person has violated or is violating any provision of this 
section, and the Secretary may obtain the assistance of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury," or other 
law enforcement agencies of the United States, and State and local 
governmental agencies, in the conduct of such investigations, under 
cooperative agreements with such agencies. A warrant to search 
for and seize any animal which there is probable cause to believe 
was involved in any violation of this section may be issued by any 
judge of the United States or of a State court of record or by a 
United States magistrate within the district wherein the animal 
sought is located. Any United States marshal or any person autho-
rized under this section to conduct investigations may apply for and 
execute any such warrant, and any animal seized under such a 
warrant shall be held by the United States marshal or other autho-
rized person pending disposition thereof by the court in accordance 
with this subsection. Necessary care including veterinary treat-
ment shall be provided while the animals are so held in custody. 
Any animal involved in any violation of this section shall be liable 
to be proceeded against and forfeited to the United States at any 
time on complaint filed in any United States district court or other 
court of the United States for any jurisdiction in which the animal 
is found and upon a judgment of forfeiture shall be disposed of by 
sale for lawful purposes or by other humane means, as the court 
may direct. Costs incurred by the United States for care of animals 
seized and forfeited under this section shall be recoverable from the 
owner of the animals if he appears in such forfeiture proceeding or 
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in a separate civil action brought in the jurisdiction in which the 
owner is found, resides, or transacts business. 
(g) Definitions 
For purposes of this section— 
(1) the term "animal fighting venture" means any event 
which involves a fight between at least two animals and is 
conducted for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment 
except that the term "animal fighting venture" shall not be 
deemed to include any activity the primary purpose of which 
involves the use of one or more animals in hunting another 
animal or animals, such as waterfowl, bird, raccoon, or fox 
hunting; 
(2) the term "interstate or foreign commerce" means— 
(A) any movement between any place in a State to any 
place in another State or between places in the same State 
through another State; or 
(B) an> movement iiom a loieign counirj into any 5tate, 
(3) the term "interstate instrumentality" means telegraph, 
telephone, radio, or television operating in interstate or foreign 
commerce; 
(4) the term "State" means any State of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and 
any territory or possession of the United States; 
(5) the term "animal" means any live bird, or any live dog or 
other mammal, except man; and 
(6) the conduct by any person of any activity prohibited by 
this section shall not render such person subject to the other 
sections of this chapter as a dealer, exhibitor, or otherwise. 
(h) Conflict with State law 
The provisions of this chapter shall not supersede or otherwise 
invalidate any such State, local, or municipal legislation or ordi-
nance relating to animal fighting ventures except in case of a direct 
and irreconcilable conflict between any requirements thereunder 
and this chapter or any rule, regulation, or standard hereunder. 
(Pub.L. 89-544, § 26(a)-(h)(l), as added Pub.L. 94-279, § 17, Apr. 22, 1976, 
90 Stat. 421.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Codifications 
1976 Act. House Report No. 94-801, Section consists of subsecs. (a) to 
House Conference Report No. 94-976, (h)(1) to section 26 of Pub.L. 89-544, as 
see 1976 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, added by Pub.L. 94-279. Subsec. (h)(2) 
p. 758. of section 26 of Pub.L. 89-544, as added 
7U.S.C.A.§§1551 to 2320—26 7 5 5 
Addendum C 
Trial Court Decision on Motion to Dismiss, 
Dated January 27, 1992 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, * 
* DECISION ON MOTION 
Plaintiff, * TO DISMISS 
* 
vs. * 
* Case No. 901001586 
DENNIS STREETER, * 
* 
Defendant. * 
* 
mis matter arose as a result of a DUI stop on May 27, 1990. 
On May 30, 1990, Dennis Streeter was charged with six counts of 
Cruelty to Animals in violation of 23-5-104 of the Revised West 
Valley City Ordinances.1 Defendant and counsel, Kirk Bennett, 
appeared and entered pleas of not guilty to all charges. A civil 
petition was then filed against Mr. Streeter by West Valley City. 
The petition sought the disposition of the animals that were the 
subject of the cruelty charges. The DUI and other criminal 
matters were resolved and defendant was sentenced on those 
matters on January 7, 1991. 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the animal cruelty 
charges on several grounds. These included 1) Federal 
l
. The defendant was charged with raising, keeping or using 
poultry for the purpose of fighting or baiting. As background for 
consideration of the arguments made by defendant the court assumes 
that the Defendant was returning from having fought the birds in 
Arizona, where such fighting is legal. (These facts having been 
established at hearings on the other criminal charges for which 
defendant has already been sentenced.) 
Preemption, 2) an Unconstitutional deprivation of property, and 
3) violations of Constitutional Due Process, alleging both 
vagueness and overbreadth* Defendant, through his attorney Kirk 
Bennett, and Plaintiff West Valley City, through Keith Stoney the 
city prosecutor, filed memorandum supporting and opposing the 
requested dismissal. The civil petition awaits the resolution of 
the criminal cruelty charges. 
PREEMPTION 
Defendant argues that the applicable West Valley City 
Ordinance2 has been preempted by Congressional legislation. In 
1976, Congress enacted the Animal Welfare Act Amendment of 1976, 
7 U.S.C. 2156, which prohibited activities related to the moving 
of fighting animals in interstate commerce.3 Violations were to 
carry penalties up to $5,000 and one year in jail.4 Within the 
criminal proscription a specific exception was made for live 
2
. Section 23-5-108 (8) (a) of the Revised Ordinances of West 
Valley City. "It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation 
to raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or bird for the purposes of 
fighting or baiting;..." 
3
. Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156, Animal fighting venture 
prohibition. 
(a) "It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sponsor 
or exhibit an animal in any animal fighting venture to which any 
animal was moved in interstate or foreign commerce," 
(b) "It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, 
buy, transport, or deliver to another person or receive from 
another person for purposes of transportation, in interstate or 
foreign commerce, any dog or other animal for purposes of having 
the dog or other animal participate in an animal fighting venture." 
4
. Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156 (e) . 
2 
birds, if the fight was to take place in a state that did not 
prohibit such fights-5 
Defendant cites sections of the Congressional Record to 
demonstrate that the intent of Congress was to allow cock 
fighting because of its historical and traditional roots* As 
Plaintiff West Valley City has pointed out, and my research 
confirmedf the citations to these quotes are inaccurate or 
misleading and raise a number of questions.6 
California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, 
93 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1987) , sets forth the task of a court when 
deciding issues of preemption. "In determining whether a state 
statute is pre-preempt by federal law and therefore invalid under 
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (the) sole task is to 
ascertain the intent of Congress."7 The United States Supreme 
Court has set out in Guerra three methods whereby Congressional 
intent may be determined when deciding whether federal action 
will supersede state enactments. First, Congress may expressly 
state that it is preempting state law. Second, Congressional 
5
. Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156 (d) . "Notwithstanding the 
provisions of subsections (a) , (b) , or (c) of the section, the 
activities prohibited by such subsections shall be unlawful with 
respect to fighting ventures involving live birds only if the fight 
is to take place in a State where it would be in violation of the 
laws thereof." 
6
. Even after the inaccuracy of the citations was pointed out 
by Plaintiff in its memorandum, Defendant has not supplied the 
Court with proper citations. This has caused additional 
difficulties because of the lack of resource materials readily 
available to the Court in the West Valley location. 
7
. 93 L. Ed. 2d 613, 623 (1987). 
3 
intent to preempt may be inferred where the scheme of federal 
regulation is so extensive or comprehensive as to leave no room 
for supplementary state action. Third, where Congress has not 
completely displaced state regulation, federal law will still 
preempt state action if either a) it is physically impossible to 
comply with both federal and state requirements or b) where state 
law becomes an obstacle to the achievement of Congressional 
objectives*8 
Rather than arguing application of one of these methods of 
determining "preemptive intent/1 Defendant simply argues that 
Congress " . • .implicitly determined that the states were not to 
interfere with the breeding and training of gamecocks for 
transportation into jurisdictions where cockfighting was 
lawful."9 Plaintiff argues that an analysis of the "Interstate 
and Foreign commerce" language demonstrates that Congress 
resolved not to meddle in the affairs of States.10 Neither of 
these arguments is convincing.11 
K Ibid. 
9
. Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, p. 
4. 
10
. Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition, p. 14. 
11
. Particularly, when the argument cites Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce language as evidencing Congressional intent not to 
interfere with States. Rather, such federal intrusion into 
otherwise state matters rests almost solely on just such commerce 
grounds. 
4 
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS 
The Congressional action that Defendant relies upon is a 
criminal statute that sets forth penalties for specific conduct. 
Congress determined that activities related to the interstate 
transportation of most fighting animals should be federal crimes. 
Congress chose, however, not to make all activities connected 
with the shipment of fighting birds criminal offenses. 
Such actions do not evidence a Congressional intent to so 
occupy a field of regulation as to preempt state regulation. 
Congressional decisions not to criminalize certain conduct does 
not mean that all such conduct is federally protected. Failure 
of Congress to include a "shoplifting" statute within its scheme 
of federal offenses does not mean that Congress has decided to 
protect such activity. There is absolutely no evidence that 
Congress intended to preempt states, and their political 
subdivisions, in the area of animal welfare. Rather, the purpose 
seems to have been one of attempting to make enforcement of 
animal cruelty statutes easier. 
Congress has certainly been capable in the past of clearly 
announcing that certain conduct is protected. When such 
protections have been established, however, Congress does not 
generally utilize a "pregnant omission" in a criminal statute to 
extend such new protection. Instead, Congress declares a clear 
5 
purpose and may then legislate criminal sanctions for failure to 
honor the protected classes of conduct,12 
In light of the Supreme Court's warning in Guerra that " . . 
.preemption is not to be lightly presumed"13 this Court is 
unwilling to determine that the failure of Congress to 
criminalize certain conduct is the equivalent of extending 
federal protection to such conduct* A decision of Congress not 
to criminalize all interstate shipments of fighting birds does 
not extend federal protection to the possession and training of 
such birds for fighting purposes. 
Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156 (d) does not preempt state or 
city regulation of fighting cocks. 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION OP PROPERTY 
Defendant contends that he is entitled to a hearing prior to 
being deprived of a significant property interest. Defendant 
argues that because the West Valley ordinance doesn't provide for 
such a hearing before prohibiting the possession of birds for the 
purpose of fighting, that the ordinance is therefore 
unconstitutional. Defendant argues that the ordinance violates 
due process by depriving him of his property right in the 
fighting cocks. West Valley City responds that proper passage of 
a criminal statute is in itself a form of due process compliance. 
Consideration in the legislative process builds in notice and an 
12
. See the history of the various voting rights acts and other 
civil rights legislation. 
13
. 93 L. Ed. 2d 613
 f 623 (1987). 
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opportunity to be heard on the issue that is subject to 
legislative prohibition. 
The City has filed a civil action to determine the 
appropriate disposition of the animals pursuant to the zoning 
violations alleged as well as the animal cruelty provisions. 
Defendant has been, and will continue to be, afforded written 
notice and an opportunity to respond, including the right to 
present evidence and question witnesses in a judicial proceeding, 
before a disposition is made of his interest in the subject 
animals. Certainly, such action meets the requirements of due 
process. 
Additionally, the Defendant has presented no law indicating 
that there is a significant property interest, requiring 
individual advance notice whenever specific items of property are 
about to become prohibited property. The Court is aware of no 
rulings requiring such advance hearings when dealing with 
proscribed birds, drugs, gambling devices, or whatever. 
The West Valley city Ordinance prohibiting the raising or 
training of fighting animals is not an unconstitutional 
deprivation of property. 
OVERBREADTH 
Defendant argues that there must be a distinction between 
raising and breeding animals for "legal" fights14 and those 
intended for illegitimate contests. Defendant argues that the 
14
. Those destined for fights in states or countries where such 
fights are legal. 
7 
City ordinance is overbroad because it fails to distinguish 
between animals fought, or intended to be fought, in states where 
such fighting is legal and those fought in states where all 
animal fights are illegal,15 Defendant cites no authority for 
such a proposition. Defendant also alleges that the ordinance 
interferes with people who raise such birds without intent to 
fight them anywhere. Defendant believes that the ordinance will 
be, or may be, enforced against such owners• 
The City contends that both the actual fighting of birds as 
well as the training of birds to fight to be equally cruel. The 
City also argues that the quality of the conduct does not change 
substantially whether the fighting is in "legal" states or 
"illegal" states. The City believes that it is entitled to 
prohibit activities that promote such conduct whenever they occur 
within its city limits. The City also contends that the 
statutory requirement of intent found in the ordinance, " . . . 
for the purpose of fighting or baiting . . .,ffl6 is sufficient to 
protect innocent pet owners, etc. 
This Court is not convinced that because particular conduct 
may be legal in another state or country, that the 
instrumentalities of such conduct must necessarily not be subject 
15
. Defendant's Memorandum in Support, p. 6. Defendant's 
argument seems hinged on the supposition that there is a protected 
right to possess property which is illegal to use in the state in 
which it is found so long as there is someplace where it may be 
lawfully used. No authority has been presented to support such a 
contention. 
16
. West Valley City Revised Ordinance 23-5-104 (8). 
8 
to criminal prohibitions in Utah. clearly, the legislative 
authority of the State, and by derivation that of the City, is 
not limited by the choices made by similar entities elsewhere. 
Nor is it a convincing argument that innocent owners may be swept 
up in the "broad brush" of the statute. In a criminal 
prosecution under this ordinance, the City must present 
sufficient proof to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the 
mental intent element of H . . .for the purpose of fighting or 
baiting . . . " Requiring proof of a mental intent is not an 
unusual or suspect, requirement:, but in fact provides the 
necessary protections for " innocent" ownership. 
The West Valley City Ordinance is not unconstitutionally 
overbroad. 
VAGUENESS 
Defendant asserts that the City ordinance is 
unconstitutionally vague; that a person of ordinary intelligence 
would not know what conduct is permissible and what conduct 
prohibited. 
The ordinance clearly allows raising birds for any purpose 
other than the purpose of fighting or baiting. On its face the 
ordinance is not vague. 
CONCLUSION 
The Motion to Dismiss is denied. The West Valley City 
Ordinance is not preempted by a Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156 
prohibiting interstate activity related to fighting animals, but 
specifically exempting from coverage birds shipped for fighting 
9 
in "legal" states* The ordinance is neither overbroad nor vague, 
An ordinance prohibiting raising or training birds for the 
purpose of fighting is not an unconstitutional deprivation of 
property. 
The motions are denied and the matter shall be set 
immediately for trial. 
Dated this ^V^7 day of January, 1992. 
*.'•« '*•• : ' " , ' ' . ' * . " • • • ' " ' - • • ' : V - * S \ 
. - - : > • • • • " . - • • • ' V / ^ 
Ciiicuit'. Court Judge A* 
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Addendum D 
Order of the Trial Court Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
Dated June 18, 1992 
Michelle J. Ivie (#5723) 
of CONDER & WANGSGARD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Fax: (801) 967-5563 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS L. STREETER, 
Defendant. 
) 
D E R 
Case No. 901001677 MC 
Case No. 901001586 MC 
Based upon the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant and the 
opposing memoranda on file herein, and for other good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is herewith denied based 
upon the grounds and for the reasons more particularly set forth 
in the Decision on Motion to Dismiss filed by this court on 
January 27, 1992. 
DATED this Q_ day of June, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
WILLIAM4'A. THORNE 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the //f^ day of June, 1992, I 
caused to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following counsel of 
record: 
Keith L. Stoney 
West Valley City Prosecutor 
3600 South 2700 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
^/^^J^z^^^^^y 
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Addendum E 
Order of the Trial Court Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
Dated June 18, 1992 
\J 
V) ! 
Michelle J. Ivie (#5723) 
of CONDER & WANGSGARD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Fax: (801) 967-5563 
' J 
is 2 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS L. STREETER, 
Defendant. 
G R 
Case No. 901001677 MC 
Case No. 901001586 MC 
Based upon defendant's Motion to Reconsider Motion to 
Dismiss which was filed March 30, 1992, and argument proferred by 
counsel for defendant at trial that same day, and for other good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
That Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss is 
hereby denied. 
DATED this fP- day of June, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
££/ WILLIAM A. THORNE 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / o ^ day of June, 1992, I 
caused to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following counsel of 
record: 
Keith L. Stoney 
West Valley City Prosecutor 
3600 South 2700 West 
West Valley City, Utah 8:119 
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